meta-code
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONINGINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions contain the directive "Explicit user instructions override anything below.", which encourages the model to bypass the skill's logic and constraints upon user request.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill documentation includes references to non-existent future versions of AI models and tools, such as "Claude 5 generation models (Anthropic, 2026-07-24)", "Opus 5.5", and "GPT-6 Astra". This metadata is deceptive and may be intended to influence the model's persona or perceived capabilities.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: The skill is designed to fetch and process data from local project files (using
rgand file reads) and external web sources (via theweb-researcherhelper defined inreferences/helper-protocols.md). - Boundary markers: While structured templates are used in
references/helper-protocols.md(e.g.,Objective:,Question:), they lack robust delimiters or specific instructions to treat external data as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions. - Capability inventory: The agent has access to file system reading tools (
rg, file reads) and external web research tools. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or validation for the data retrieved from external URLs or project files before it is processed by the AI.
Audit Metadata