skills/arthjean/skills/write-prd/Gen Agent Trust Hub

write-prd

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external content that could contain hidden instructions to influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: The skill ingests user input ($ARGUMENTS), web research results, and local codebase contents (Phase 2 in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Prompt templates in references/brainstorm-protocols.md lack explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the research material.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can read project files via agent-explorer, write arbitrary files to the filesystem (Phase 5d in SKILL.md), and execute shell commands and external packages (Phase 3f and references/brainstorm-protocols.md).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering logic is present to validate synthesized research before it is used for technical decisions.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads and executes an external package from a public registry at runtime without a pinned version.
  • Evidence: The Documentation Lookup Prompt Template in references/brainstorm-protocols.md specifies the use of bunx ctx7@latest to fetch documentation from npm.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands derived from codebase configuration files, which could lead to code execution if the manifests are compromised.
  • Evidence: Phase 3f in SKILL.md identifies and executes commands such as cargo check, cargo clippy, and bun run typecheck based on the detected project tech stack.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 28, 2026, 11:06 AM