write-prd
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external content that could contain hidden instructions to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests user input (
$ARGUMENTS), web research results, and local codebase contents (Phase 2 inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Prompt templates in
references/brainstorm-protocols.mdlack explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the research material. - Capability inventory: The skill can read project files via
agent-explorer, write arbitrary files to the filesystem (Phase 5d inSKILL.md), and execute shell commands and external packages (Phase 3f andreferences/brainstorm-protocols.md). - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering logic is present to validate synthesized research before it is used for technical decisions.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads and executes an external package from a public registry at runtime without a pinned version.
- Evidence: The
Documentation Lookup Prompt Templateinreferences/brainstorm-protocols.mdspecifies the use ofbunx ctx7@latestto fetch documentation from npm. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands derived from codebase configuration files, which could lead to code execution if the manifests are compromised.
- Evidence: Phase 3f in
SKILL.mdidentifies and executes commands such ascargo check,cargo clippy, andbun run typecheckbased on the detected project tech stack.
Audit Metadata