openclaw-browser-setup
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs the agent to retrieve the gateway authentication token using the command
openclaw config get gateway.auth.token. This exposes sensitive credentials directly into the agent's execution context. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8). It performs operations that ingest untrusted external data which is then processed by the agent.
- Ingestion points: The agent navigates to arbitrary URLs and captures page content using
openclaw browser --browser-profile openclaw snapshotandscreenshotcommands (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: There are no instructions for the agent to ignore or delimit embedded instructions within the captured snapshots or screenshots.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses powerful administrative capabilities, including device approval (
openclaw devices approve <requestId>) and configuration modification (openclaw config set ...). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the external web content is mentioned before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
openclawCLI to perform system-level changes, including restarting services (openclaw gateway restart) and approving new device connections. While these are the primary functions of the skill, their proximity to untrusted data ingestion increases the risk of automated exploitation.
Audit Metadata