skillport-distribution-system

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation provides instructions to run several shell scripts and CLI commands for skill lifecycle management.
  • Evidence: Execution of scripts/create-agent-skill-repo.sh and scripts/skillport-sync.sh.
  • Evidence: Usage of npx skills add and npx skills update commands.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The workflow is centered around fetching and installing executable skill packages from arbitrary remote GitHub repositories.
  • Evidence: npx skills add https://github.com/OWNER/REPO --list downloads content from a remote URL.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The skill guides the user to establish automated background processes that persist across system restarts and sessions.
  • Evidence: Use of macOS LaunchAgents to run refresh tasks at login and wake-up.
  • Evidence: Use of Windows Task Scheduler to execute synchronization every 15 minutes.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The distribution mechanism facilitates the ingestion of instructions from external repositories, which can introduce malicious content into the agent environment.
  • Ingestion points: Remote GitHub repositories via npx skills add commands.
  • Boundary markers: Absent for the ingested content in external repositories.
  • Capability inventory: Shell script execution, subprocess calls via npx, and file system writes to ~/.agents/skills.
  • Sanitization: Mentions credential and personal data scans for outbound pushes, but lacks explicit sanitization for incoming remote content.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The refresh process involves invoking a script to dynamically regenerate agent instruction files.
  • Evidence: Invocation of scripts/regenerate-agents-md.py to update global guidance.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 27, 2026, 09:29 AM