deckkit-ppt-replica
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted external content, including BBox metadata and source images, which creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious instructions could influence agent behavior during the reconstruction process.\n
- Ingestion points:
manifests/initial-bbox.final.jsonandinput/source.png.\n - Boundary markers: None. The skill interpolates external data directly into script templates and prompts.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill performs file system writes, executes shell commands (
node,npm,grep), and accesses the network to download packages.\n - Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or escaping of the ingested data is specified before its use in scripts.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses templates to generate and execute local JavaScript files at runtime to manage the PowerPoint generation workflow.\n
- Evidence: Instructions provide source code for
crop-assets.mjs,build-svg-assets.mjs, andgenerate.mjs.\n - Pattern: These generated scripts are executed locally using the
nodecommand.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs software dependencies from a remote registry during the setup phase.\n - Evidence: The skill uses
npm installto fetch@artifact-kit/deckkitand@artifact-kit/deckkit-pro.\n - Context: These packages originate from the skill's author (
artifact-kit), representing standard vendor-owned functionality.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various shell commands to manage the environment and run reconstruction scripts.\n - Evidence: Commands include
npm install,node scripts/...,git rev-parse --show-toplevel, andgrepfor icon metadata.
Audit Metadata