skill-creator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently uses shell commands to manage its workflow, including
cp -rfor snapshotting skills,nohupandkillfor managing background web server processes, andopento trigger system-level file opening in the browser. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: It executes several local Python modules and scripts (e.g.,
scripts.aggregate_benchmark,scripts.run_loop,scripts.package_skill, andgenerate_review.py) which represent the core logic of the skill creator. Additionally, it spawns subagents to execute task prompts provided inevals.json, which constitutes execution of arbitrary instructions. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to read from the local filesystem to capture feedback and test results. It specifically monitors the
~/Downloads/directory foreval_set.jsonfiles and creates workspace directories to store iteration data. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions advise the agent to write "pushy" descriptions for new skills to manipulate and override the model's default triggering thresholds. It also explicitly permits "DAN" (Do Anything Now) style roleplay instructions in the skills it creates.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by processing external data from
feedback.jsonandevals.jsonwithout sanitization. - Ingestion points: Reads feedback from
feedback.jsonand task prompts fromevals.json(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None used to delimit untrusted data from instructions.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution via Python, shell command execution, and subagent spawning.
- Sanitization: No validation or escaping of the ingested JSON content before processing.
Audit Metadata