docx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pycontains an embedded C source string that is written to a temporary location and compiled at runtime into a shared library usinggcc. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill uses the
LD_PRELOADenvironment variable to inject the compiled shim library into thesofficeexecution environment. While intended for sandbox compatibility (shimming AF_UNIX sockets), process injection is a high-risk technique. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: In
scripts/accept_changes.py, the skill dynamically generates a LibreOffice Basic macro (Module1.xba) and saves it to a temporary profile directory to automate document tasks. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on several external CLI tools including
soffice,pandoc,gcc, andpdftoppmfor document conversion, validation, and shim compilation. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user documents which serves as an attack surface. 1. Ingestion points: Reads XML content from user-provided
.docxfiles. 2. Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt instructions to delineate or isolate untrusted document content. 3. Capability inventory: Spawns shell commands, compiles binary code, and modifies the local filesystem. 4. Sanitization: Employsdefusedxmlto protect against XML-based attacks during parsing.
Audit Metadata