skill-crafting
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/analyze-all.pyimplements a fallback mechanism to dynamically load its sibling scripts (analyze-cso.py,analyze-compatibility.py, andcheck-char-budget.py) usingimportlib.utilat runtime if standard module imports are unsuccessful. While limited to the skill's own installation directory, this uses computed paths for module loading. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external, potentially untrusted skill files, which creates a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Skill files (SKILL.md, references, scripts) are read from the file system via user-provided paths in scripts like
analyze-all.pyandanalyze-cso.py. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are employed within the scripts when reading and parsing the content of analyzed files.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Read,Write, and a scopedBashtool limited to its internal scripts to perform its analysis. - Sanitization: The analysis scripts use regular expression matching to detect patterns but do not perform sanitization or escaping of the processed external text, allowing for potential prompt interpolation issues.
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