skill-crafting

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/analyze-all.py implements a fallback mechanism to dynamically load its sibling scripts (analyze-cso.py, analyze-compatibility.py, and check-char-budget.py) using importlib.util at runtime if standard module imports are unsuccessful. While limited to the skill's own installation directory, this uses computed paths for module loading.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external, potentially untrusted skill files, which creates a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Skill files (SKILL.md, references, scripts) are read from the file system via user-provided paths in scripts like analyze-all.py and analyze-cso.py.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are employed within the scripts when reading and parsing the content of analyzed files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes Read, Write, and a scoped Bash tool limited to its internal scripts to perform its analysis.
  • Sanitization: The analysis scripts use regular expression matching to detect patterns but do not perform sanitization or escaping of the processed external text, allowing for potential prompt interpolation issues.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 15, 2026, 10:49 PM