aegis-backup-dr
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs discovery sweeps that access sensitive file paths to audit security posture. Evidence in
SKILL.mdshows it searches for TLS private keys in/etc/ssl/private, application secrets in.envfiles, and backup-specific credentials such asRESTIC_PASSWORDandBORG_PASSPHRASE. While this is aligned with the purpose of a backup audit, it involves direct exposure of host credentials and encryption material. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data by parsing documentation and runbooks to identify recovery evidence. This creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The audit sweep in
SKILL.mdusesgrepto search for patterns like 'restore', 'RTO', 'RPO', and 'disaster' withinREADME*,docs/,runbooks/, and other markdown files. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are used to distinguish untrusted file content from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
systemctl,grep,find,awk,ss,docker, andfilefor discovery. It does not define network-outbound or file-write capabilities for the audit phase. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering logic is present for the processed documentation content.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on complex shell command sequences for discovery, including enumerating systemd timers, searching crontabs, and scanning the filesystem for backup artifacts using
findandgrepacross/usr/local/sbin,/opt, and/root/binas defined inSKILL.md. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill explicitly requires root access to perform a complete audit of the host. This includes reading system cron spools in
/var/spool/cron/crontabsand listing crontabs for all service accounts, as described in the 'What To Check' and 'Where To Look' sections ofSKILL.md.
Audit Metadata