skills/ascend-ai-coding/awesome-ascend-skills/external-cannbot-ops-triton-task-extractor/Gen Agent Trust Hub
external-cannbot-ops-triton-task-extractor
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/validate_task.pyemploys theexec()function to run the generated operator task file. This file is directly derived from user-supplied source code. The execution of untrusted code at runtime is a high-risk operation that can lead to full system compromise. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The extraction workflow takes user-controlled file paths as input and executes the contents through the validation script. An attacker providing a crafted Python file can achieve remote code execution (RCE) within the agent's execution environment.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.md(Step 4) mandate the use of thebashtool to execute a shell command (python3 <skill-path>/scripts/validate_task.py ...) which subsequently triggers the dynamic execution of the user's code. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted code from external files without sanitization.
- Ingestion points: User-provided source code files are read in
Step 1of the extraction process. - Boundary markers: None identified; there are no delimiters or warnings to the LLM to ignore instructions embedded in the input code.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
exec()inscripts/validate_task.pyand spawns subprocesses to run the validation script as defined inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: No filtering, escaping, or validation of the logic within the user-provided code is performed beyond a basic AST structure check.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata