skills/ascend-ai-coding/awesome-ascend-skills/external-gitcode-ascend-verl-async-dapo/Gen Agent Trust Hub
external-gitcode-ascend-verl-async-dapo
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill handles
SWANLAB_API_KEYcredentials. Inscripts/quick_start.sh, this key is passed as an environment variable within a command string todocker exec. This practice exposes the sensitive key in the host system's process table (visible viaps), making it accessible to other users on the machine. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]:
scripts/run_dapo.shemploys dynamic execution by usingconfig_generator.pyto write a temporary shell script to/tmp/run_verl_temp.shand then executing it. This pattern of generating and running code at runtime is a risk if parameters are influenced by untrusted inputs. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]:
scripts/common.shattempts to load a shell library from a hardcoded path belonging to an external skill (~/.claude/skills/swanlab-setup/scripts/functions.sh), creating a dependency on external code. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several scripts (e.g.,
quick_start.sh) construct complex shell commands fordocker execusing multiple interpolated environment variables, which increases the potential for command injection if variables are not properly sanitized. - [SAFE]: The YARA detection for dangerous process control in
scripts/common.shrelates topkill -9 ray. In the context of this skill's purpose—managing a Ray distributed training cluster—this is a benign cleanup task.
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