vllm-bench-serve
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts
scripts/run_bench.sh,scripts/run_batch.sh, andscripts/auto_optimize.pybuild shell commands forvllm bench serveby interpolating variables provided by the user, such asbase_url,model, anddataset_path. Without strict validation, this pattern is susceptible to command injection. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: In
scripts/auto_optimize.py, the skill executes shell commands usingsubprocess.run(cmd, shell=True). This is a known risky pattern when the command string contains dynamic content derived from external or user-supplied sources. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a significant attack surface for indirect injection as it ingests data from user-specified endpoints and file paths which are then leveraged in shell execution. \n
- Ingestion points: User-supplied parameters such as
base-url,model, anddataset-pathused throughout the benchmarking workflow. \n - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement boundary markers or instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands in the processed data. \n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands and interact with network services. \n
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the input variables before they are interpolated into shell command strings.
Audit Metadata