ascend-docker

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The script scripts/run-ascend-container.sh defaults to a 'privileged' mode that uses the --privileged, --net=host, and --ipc=host Docker flags. These settings bypass standard container isolation, granting the container root-level capabilities on the host system and its network stack.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script mounts the entire host /home directory to the container (-v /home:/home). This exposure allows any process or image running in the container to access sensitive user data, such as SSH keys, configuration files, and private documents stored on the host.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes docker run with significant privileges and mounts system-level directories like /usr/local/sbin from the host to the container.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The scripts/run-ascend-container.sh script does not quote the IMAGE and CONTAINER_NAME variables when interpolating them into the shell-executed docker run command. This lack of sanitization could allow for command or flag injection if a user or automated process provides a malicious string as an argument.
  • Ingestion points: The IMAGE and CONTAINER_NAME arguments in scripts/run-ascend-container.sh (derived from $1 and $2).
  • Boundary markers: None present.
  • Capability inventory: The script performs high-privilege docker run operations with device and volume mapping.
  • Sanitization: None detected for the shell variable interpolation.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches development images from the official Huawei Ascend Hub (ascendhub.huawei.com).
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 20, 2026, 01:44 PM