ascend-docker
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The script
scripts/run-ascend-container.shdefaults to a 'privileged' mode that uses the--privileged,--net=host, and--ipc=hostDocker flags. These settings bypass standard container isolation, granting the container root-level capabilities on the host system and its network stack. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script mounts the entire host
/homedirectory to the container (-v /home:/home). This exposure allows any process or image running in the container to access sensitive user data, such as SSH keys, configuration files, and private documents stored on the host. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes
docker runwith significant privileges and mounts system-level directories like/usr/local/sbinfrom the host to the container. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
scripts/run-ascend-container.shscript does not quote theIMAGEandCONTAINER_NAMEvariables when interpolating them into the shell-executeddocker runcommand. This lack of sanitization could allow for command or flag injection if a user or automated process provides a malicious string as an argument. - Ingestion points: The
IMAGEandCONTAINER_NAMEarguments inscripts/run-ascend-container.sh(derived from$1and$2). - Boundary markers: None present.
- Capability inventory: The script performs high-privilege
docker runoperations with device and volume mapping. - Sanitization: None detected for the shell variable interpolation.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches development images from the official Huawei Ascend Hub (
ascendhub.huawei.com).
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata