ascendc-operator-performance-eval

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 3, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting data from external files to drive its execution logic.
  • Ingestion points: csrc/ops/<op>/test/<op>-test-cases.md, csrc/ops/<op>/design.md, and <op>_perf_cases.jsonl.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. Content from external files is processed without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: Includes dynamic library loading via torch.ops.load_library and file system write access in layer_norm_profiler_common.py.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not validate or escape content extracted from the markdown or JSONL files before using it to configure operator tests.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic loading of executable code from computed file system paths.
  • Evidence: The load_custom_library function in layer_norm_profiler_common.py uses glob.glob to find shared object files and executes torch.ops.load_library(lib_files[0]). While this is intended for loading the operator's own implementation for performance profiling, this mechanism allows for the execution of arbitrary compiled code if a malicious library is placed in the expected directory structure.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 3, 2026, 06:48 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — ascendc-operator-performance-eval