atb-nnal-installer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes binary installers and system utilities to configure the NPU environment.
- Evidence: Use of
./Ascend-cann-nnal_*.run --install,npu-smi info, andwhich bisheng. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill requests elevated permissions for file system operations.
- Evidence: Explicitly suggests
sudo ./Ascend-cann-nnal_*.runfor installation to system-protected directories such as/usr/local/Ascend. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill ensures environment variables remain active across reboots/logins.
- Evidence: Modification of
~/.bashrcusingcat >> ~/.bashrc << EOFto source environment scripts. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from local hardware status and config files, creating a surface for potential injection.
- Ingestion points: Outputs of
npu-smi info,bisheng --version, and contents ofversion.cfgfiles. - Boundary markers: Absent; instructions do not wrap external content in delimiters or provide ignore-instruction warnings.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution, file-write (
.bashrc), and binary execution across SKILL.md. - Sanitization: Absent; the skill relies on raw output from these commands to determine installation status.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external container images for component extraction.
- Evidence: Pulling from
quay.io/ascend/cann, which is an official distribution channel for the software vendor.
Audit Metadata