atb-ops-to-aclnn-migration-workflow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user-provided operator names, background documentation, and reference URLs in Phases 0 and 1 to guide the migration process. This creates an attack surface where instructions embedded in external documentation could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Operator names, background context files, and documentation URLs (SKILL.md Phase 0/1).
- Boundary markers: The workflow uses explicit 'Gates' requiring user confirmation before advancing to the next phase, which acts as a safety boundary.
- Capability inventory: Employs
Bash,Write,Readtools, and the ability to spawn subagents (SKILL.md Phase 5a). - Sanitization: The skill does not explicitly mention sanitization or validation of the input strings before they are interpolated into the subagent prompts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various shell commands via the
Bashtool for project management and testing tasks, includinggit log,grep, and running Python-based test scripts (atb_csv_ops_test.py). Pre- and Post-tool use hooks also usegrepandechoto monitor the project state. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Phase 5a utilizes a dynamic subagent delegation pattern for performance testing. This involves constructing a prompt for a subagent that includes shell script logic with interpolated variables like
{op}and{ATB_REPO_PATH}.
Audit Metadata