hccl-test
Audited by Socket on Sep 20, 2026
5 alerts found:
SecurityAnomalyx4The script appears to be a legitimate HCCL multi-node test harness, not an embedded malware payload. However, it has significant security weaknesses: unvalidated and unquoted input, shell execution through a constructed command string, disabled SSH host-key verification, root-default remote access, broad remote pkill usage, and insecure /tmp file handling. It should only be used with tightly controlled arguments and trusted nodes, and should be hardened before deployment in an untrusted or shared environment.
The code appears to be a legitimate HCCL environment preflight script, with no clear malicious behavior. It has security weaknesses: disabled SSH host verification, default root access, and unquoted variable interpolation in local and remote shell commands. These issues can enable command injection or host impersonation when inputs or environment variables are attacker-controlled. The malformed redirection operators may also cause execution failures. Inputs should be validated and quoted, SSH host verification should remain enabled, and non-root access should be preferred.
该片段是合法的 HCCL 多机测试前置检查指南,未发现明确恶意代码、数据泄露或后门行为。主要风险来自 root 免密 SSH、停用防火墙、永久开放大范围端口以及可能缺少输入校验和主机密钥验证。应在隔离测试环境使用非 root 账户、限制端口和来源地址,并审查实际 pre-test-check.sh 内容。
The supplied content is troubleshooting documentation and shows no evidence of malicious behavior or obfuscation. It contains operationally dangerous instructions: distributed forced process termination, root SSH access, privileged Docker execution, host networking, and system configuration changes. These actions should be restricted to authorized environments, and the `pkill` patterns and container image should be carefully validated before use.
The fragment is operational documentation for privileged HCCL Docker execution and contains no evident malware or intentional backdoor behavior. Its main security risks are reduced container isolation from --privileged and --network host, exposure of host SSH credentials through /root/.ssh, broad host filesystem/device access, and the insecure chmod 666 fallback. The unpinned mpich:latest image should be replaced with a verified digest-pinned image.