npu-adapter-reviewer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands based on user-provided inputs, specifically
git clone <repo_url>andls -la <local_path>during the initial code acquisition phase. Additionally, it runs generated verification scripts and testing tools such asverify_npu.shandpytestduring the validation phase. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and provides instructions to download the CANN Toolkit from official Huawei cloud infrastructure (e.g.,
ascend-repo.obs.cn-east-2.myhuaweicloud.com). These downloads target a well-known technology service provider. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The reference documentation provided with the skill includes instructions for downloading and executing installation scripts (e.g.,
bash Ascend-cann-toolkit_...run --install). These execution patterns are associated with official vendor resources from Huawei. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it analyzes external, potentially untrusted code repositories while possessing high-privilege capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Source code files obtained via
git cloneor local directory scanning as described in Phase 1. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or provide directives for the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the analyzed source code.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to execute shell commands, run Python scripts, and write new files to the local environment.
- Sanitization: There are no documented mechanisms for sanitizing or validating the content of the analyzed files before they are processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata