agent-backend-adapter
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The code templates (
templates/train_template.pyandtemplates/vllm_adapter_template.py) include acopy_fileutility function usingshutil.copy2. This function is exposed via command-line arguments (--copy_fromand--copy_to), allowing the generated scripts to move arbitrary files on the local filesystem if executed by the agent or a user. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill configuration and documentation (e.g.,
references/vllm_integration.mdandreferences/config_schemas.md) explicitly set or recommendtrust_remote_code=Truefor vLLM and other frameworks. This setting allows the execution of arbitrary Python code bundled with models downloaded from remote repositories like HuggingFace. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The presence of a generic file-copying mechanism in generated templates creates a surface for data exposure. An attacker could potentially use indirect prompt injection to trick the agent into using these flags to copy sensitive system files (e.g., SSH keys or environment secrets) to a directory where they could be easily accessed or further exfiltrated.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses a template-based code generation logic in
scripts/generate_all.pythat relies on simple string replacement (t.replace("{" + k + "}", v)) without sanitization. This is a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection, where a malicious user could inject code into the framework names or other parameters that would then be written into the executable generated scripts.
Audit Metadata