gitcode-issue-reply
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection because it ingests untrusted text from GitCode issue descriptions and comments to populate prompts for draft generation.
- Ingestion points: Issue body and comments fetched via
fetch_issueandfetch_commentsinprepare_issue_reply.py. - Boundary markers: Uses delimiters such as "【当前 Issue 内容】" in
references/prompts/draft_reply.txtto separate untrusted data. - Capability inventory: The skill can post comments to GitCode repositories using
scripts/post_comment.py. - Sanitization: The
PromptInjectionDetectorinscripts/security_filter.pyis explicitly limited to credential leak detection and does not filter for injection patterns. However, the requirement for a human maintainer to review the draft and provide an explicit "Send" command acts as a critical security control. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to fetch data from non-whitelisted external sources.
- Image Downloads: The
download_imagefunction inscripts/utils.pydownloads images from arbitrary URLs found within GitCode issues usingurllib.request. - Knowledge Base Queries: The
deepwiki_queryfunction inscripts/utils.pysends repository names and issue snippets tohttps://mcp.deepwiki.com/mcpto retrieve contextual information. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: On Windows platforms, the skill utilizes
subprocess.check_outputto execute PowerShell commands via the hardcoded pathC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe. This is used specifically to retrieve theGITCODE_TOKENfrom User and Machine environment variables.
Audit Metadata