pr-media-monitoring

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest, analyze, and summarize data from untrusted external sources such as PTT, Dcard, and various news and social media channels. This monitoring workflow creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where attackers can embed instructions in public posts that the agent might interpret as directives when processing brand mentions or sentiment.
  • Ingestion points: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to fetch data via PTT search scripts, Dcard APIs, and news monitoring tools (documented in examples/sample_scenario.md and references/taiwan-media.md).
  • Boundary markers: The provided report templates and output formats lack explicit delimiters or instructions to the model to ignore any command-like text found within the monitored snippets.
  • Capability inventory: The defined workflow includes automated triggers that result in actions, such as sending LINE notifications to management or activating crisis protocols, which could be exploited by specific injection payloads.
  • Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any sanitization, filtering, or validation steps for the external content before it is processed by the model.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 18, 2026, 02:06 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — pr-media-monitoring