asana
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a local binary named
asanato execute commands such asstatus,list-tools, andcall-toolfor interacting with the Asana platform. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data including tasks, comments, and project details from Asana, which represents a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested through the
asana call-toolcommand which fetches content from Asana's API (manifest.yaml, SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify explicit boundary markers or delimiters for the ingested content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write, update, and delete tasks, projects, and comments based on user-approved scopes (manifest.yaml).
- Sanitization: The skill relies on the structured tool-calling interface of the
asanaCLI and the Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for data handling. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and interacts with official Asana domains (
mcp.asana.comandapp.asana.com) for OAuth 2.0 authentication flows and API communication (connector_auth_config.yaml).
Audit Metadata