debug

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 4, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill explicitly directs the agent to read configuration files such as ~/.claude/settings.json and /private/tmp/skillcap/.claude/settings.local.json. These files are standard locations for storing authentication tokens, API keys, and other sensitive platform credentials.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The instructions require the agent to read session debug logs (~/.claude/debug/{{SESSION_ID}}.txt) and daemon logs (~/.claude/daemon.log). These files frequently contain environment variables, PII, and internal system state that could be exposed if the agent is manipulated.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill specifies the use of grep to search for specific error and warning patterns across system files, which involves the execution of shell commands by the agent.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection:
  • Ingestion points: Reads external, untrusted content from debug logs (~/.claude/debug/*.txt) and background daemon logs.
  • Boundary markers: None. The skill does not instruct the agent to use delimiters or ignore instructions embedded within the logs.
  • Capability inventory: Includes file reading, shell command execution (grep), and subagent invocation (claude-code-guide).
  • Sanitization: None. Data from logs is processed directly to identify failure patterns, allowing malicious instructions in the logs to potentially influence the agent's summary or subsequent steps.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 4, 2026, 12:30 AM