docx
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill performs runtime compilation and library injection to facilitate its operations.
scripts/office/soffice.pycontains a hardcoded C source string (_SHIM_SOURCE) that is written to a temporary file and compiled usinggcc -shared -fPICat runtime.- The resulting shared library is loaded via the
LD_PRELOADenvironment variable to intercept socket-related system calls during LibreOffice execution. scripts/accept_changes.pydynamically generates a LibreOffice Basic macro (Module1.xba) in a temporary profile directory to automate the acceptance of tracked changes.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted documents from external parties, creating an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads and processes content from
.docxand.dotxfiles usingpandoc,unzip, and XML parsers. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to isolate document text from the instruction context.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes several powerful system utilities (
soffice,pandoc,pdftoppm,gcc,zip,unzip) viasubprocess.run. - Sanitization: The skill mitigates some archive-based attacks by removing symlinks from unpacked directories but does not sanitize text content for embedded instructions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of
subprocess.runto interact with the operating system and execute external binaries for document processing and compilation.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata