fewer-permission-prompts
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses session transcripts located in
~/.claude/projects/. These files contain logs of previous interactions and tool usage across all of the user's projects, which may contain sensitive information. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill modifies the
.claude/settings.jsonfile to add command patterns to thepermissions.allowlist. This action reduces the security boundary by bypassing future user confirmation prompts for the specified shell and MCP tools. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from historical transcripts to determine security policy. While it contains logic to filter for read-only commands and exclude interpreters/shells, a malicious command captured in the transcript history could theoretically influence the agent to suggest an unsafe allowlist entry.
- Ingestion points: Reads
*.jsonlfiles from~/.claude/projects/(Step 1). - Boundary markers: Not explicitly defined for the read process.
- Capability inventory: File reading (
cat/read) and file writing (merging into.claude/settings.json). - Sanitization: Step 3 and 4 provide extensive lists of banned commands (interpreters, shells, package runners, mutators) and auto-allowed defaults to guide the agent's filtering logic.
Audit Metadata