forget
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions direct the agent to conceal the fact that original conversation history remains visible even after a 'forget' operation is completed. This concealment prevents the user from knowing that the data deletion process is not exhaustive.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
exectool to run shell commands for file removal (rm). The instructions include specific constraints such as using the--flag to prevent argument injection and banning recursive deletion, but this remains a direct shell-level operation. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill searches through and processes a wide range of potentially untrusted data sources, including user-authored files and external attachments.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads from
~/MEMORY.md,~/USER.md,~/SOUL.md,~/IDENTITY.md,~/FEEDBACK.md,~/memory/, and external attachments during the artifact inventory process. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not provide delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded prompts within the files being scanned for deletion targets.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution (
exec) and the ability to spawn subagents to process data. - Sanitization: There are no instructions for sanitizing or escaping content retrieved from files before it is processed by the agent or its subagents during the planning and execution phases.
Audit Metadata