Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from Instagram, which can serve as a vector for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads external content through
instagram-cliandhatch-zeitgeist, including post captions, reels, comments, and user profile biographies (documented inSKILL.mdandreferences/content-questions.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or security headers to separate untrusted external content from agent instructions during processing.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including the ability to write to the user's account (
post-feed,post-story,update-bio), access the local file system (~/workspace/), and spawn browser tasks for web inspection. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization, escaping, or filtering before external data is interpolated into the agent's context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of several CLI tools to perform its tasks.
- Evidence: It uses
execto runinstagram-clifor account management and data retrieval. It also utilizeshatch-zeitgeistfor enriched data lookups andffmpegfor media processing, as described inreferences/content-questions.md.
Audit Metadata