lovable

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a local command-line interface binary (lovable) to manage project states, authorization, and tool execution. It invokes various subcommands including status, authorize-url, and call-tool.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core functionality of reading untrusted external data.
  • Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read project source code, messages, and knowledge base content (code.read, projects.read, project_knowledge.read) from the Lovable platform as specified in manifest.yaml and SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear boundaries or provide warnings to the agent to treat data from these ingestion points as potentially adversarial instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including editing projects (projects.edit), running database queries (database.query), and publishing code changes (projects.publish).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or filtering before the ingested data is processed by the agent's logic.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill employs a dynamic tool-calling mechanism (lovable call-tool). It fetches and executes tool definitions from a remote provider catalogue (lovable.dev) using the lovable call-tool command. While the instructions indicate that tools are reviewed before being made available, this architecture involves executing remotely defined logic at runtime.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 5, 2026, 01:17 AM