lovable
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a local command-line interface binary (
lovable) to manage project states, authorization, and tool execution. It invokes various subcommands includingstatus,authorize-url, andcall-tool. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core functionality of reading untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read project source code, messages, and knowledge base content (
code.read,projects.read,project_knowledge.read) from the Lovable platform as specified inmanifest.yamlandSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear boundaries or provide warnings to the agent to treat data from these ingestion points as potentially adversarial instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including editing projects (
projects.edit), running database queries (database.query), and publishing code changes (projects.publish). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or filtering before the ingested data is processed by the agent's logic.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill employs a dynamic tool-calling mechanism (
lovable call-tool). It fetches and executes tool definitions from a remote provider catalogue (lovable.dev) using thelovable call-toolcommand. While the instructions indicate that tools are reviewed before being made available, this architecture involves executing remotely defined logic at runtime.
Audit Metadata