Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted PDF data from external sources and extracts text/metadata which is then fed into the agent's context. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions embedded in a PDF could trick the agent.
- Ingestion points: Multiple scripts and instructions (
SKILL.md,FORMS.md,scripts/extract_form_structure.py) ingest PDF content viapypdf,pdfplumber, andpytesseract. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define boundary markers or clear 'ignore instructions' delimiters for the extracted text.
- Capability inventory: The skill has broad capabilities including file system write access, execution of CLI tools (ImageMagick, qpdf, poppler-utils), and data manipulation.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the text extracted from PDFs before the agent uses it.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses runtime code modification to alter the behavior of an external library.
- Evidence: In
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.py, the functionmonkeypatch_pydpf_methodreassignsDictionaryObject.get_inheritedfrom thepypdflibrary to a local wrapper function. This dynamic patching changes the execution logic of the dependency at runtime.
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