pdf

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted PDF data from external sources and extracts text/metadata which is then fed into the agent's context. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions embedded in a PDF could trick the agent.
  • Ingestion points: Multiple scripts and instructions (SKILL.md, FORMS.md, scripts/extract_form_structure.py) ingest PDF content via pypdf, pdfplumber, and pytesseract.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define boundary markers or clear 'ignore instructions' delimiters for the extracted text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has broad capabilities including file system write access, execution of CLI tools (ImageMagick, qpdf, poppler-utils), and data manipulation.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the text extracted from PDFs before the agent uses it.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses runtime code modification to alter the behavior of an external library.
  • Evidence: In scripts/fill_fillable_fields.py, the function monkeypatch_pydpf_method reassigns DictionaryObject.get_inherited from the pypdf library to a local wrapper function. This dynamic patching changes the execution logic of the dependency at runtime.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 15, 2026, 08:00 PM