plugin-authoring

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 3, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documents and provides examples for using the $.process.run and $.process.spawn APIs, which allow plugins to execute arbitrary host commands. This capability is inherent to the developer-focused nature of the skill but represents a high-privilege attack surface.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the creation, loading, and execution of dynamic TypeScript/JavaScript modules ('mods') that run within the agent's environment. It describes a hot-reloading mechanism and a 'Register' hook system that allows these mods to intercept and modify agent behavior at runtime.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill describes a plugin framework that ingests untrusted data from multiple sources (files, network requests, and model responses) and interpolates it into the agent's context or uses it to trigger capabilities.
  • Ingestion points: Plugins can read from the file system ($.fs.read), fetch data over the network via specific tool calls, and process model completions ($.model.complete).
  • Boundary markers: The documentation suggests using delimiters for some contexts, but overall boundary enforcement is left to the individual plugin author.
  • Capability inventory: Plugins have access to $.fs (file system), $.process (command execution), $.network (external communication), $.model (LLM calls), and $.agent (subagent spawning).
  • Sanitization: The skill mentions a scan_secrets tool to check for credentials before sharing mods, but runtime sanitization of data processed by the hooks is not enforced by the framework itself.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 3, 2026, 08:46 AM