plugin-authoring
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documents and provides examples for using the
$.process.runand$.process.spawnAPIs, which allow plugins to execute arbitrary host commands. This capability is inherent to the developer-focused nature of the skill but represents a high-privilege attack surface. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the creation, loading, and execution of dynamic TypeScript/JavaScript modules ('mods') that run within the agent's environment. It describes a hot-reloading mechanism and a 'Register' hook system that allows these mods to intercept and modify agent behavior at runtime.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill describes a plugin framework that ingests untrusted data from multiple sources (files, network requests, and model responses) and interpolates it into the agent's context or uses it to trigger capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Plugins can read from the file system (
$.fs.read), fetch data over the network via specific tool calls, and process model completions ($.model.complete). - Boundary markers: The documentation suggests using delimiters for some contexts, but overall boundary enforcement is left to the individual plugin author.
- Capability inventory: Plugins have access to
$.fs(file system),$.process(command execution),$.network(external communication),$.model(LLM calls), and$.agent(subagent spawning). - Sanitization: The skill mentions a
scan_secretstool to check for credentials before sharing mods, but runtime sanitization of data processed by the hooks is not enforced by the framework itself.
Audit Metadata