pptx
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pyperforms runtime C code compilation and library injection. It writes source code to a temporary file/tmp/lo_socket_shim.cand usesgccto compile it into a shared object library. This library is then injected into thesofficeprocess via theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable to intercept and redirect system socket calls.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several scripts utilizesubprocess.runto execute external system binaries. Evidence includesscripts/office/soffice.pyexecutinggccandsoffice,scripts/thumbnail.pyexecutingpdftoppm, andscripts/office/validators/redlining.pyexecutinggitfor diffing content.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill extracts text from user-provided PowerPoint files, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.\n - Ingestion points: Uses
markitdownto extract text content from PowerPoint files (.pptx,.potx) as described inSKILL.md.\n - Boundary markers: Slide number markers (
<!-- Slide number: N -->) are used to delimit content, but the skill lacks explicit instructions for the agent to ignore or isolate potentially malicious instructions embedded within that text.\n - Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant execution capabilities, including runtime code compilation (
gcc), binary execution (subprocess.run), and file system manipulation (rezip,safe_extract).\n - Sanitization: The skill correctly utilizes
defusedxmlacross its validation and cleaning scripts (scripts/clean.py,scripts/office/validate.py) to mitigate XML-based attacks like XXE.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata