pptx

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/office/soffice.py performs runtime C code compilation and library injection. It writes source code to a temporary file /tmp/lo_socket_shim.c and uses gcc to compile it into a shared object library. This library is then injected into the soffice process via the LD_PRELOAD environment variable to intercept and redirect system socket calls.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several scripts utilize subprocess.run to execute external system binaries. Evidence includes scripts/office/soffice.py executing gcc and soffice, scripts/thumbnail.py executing pdftoppm, and scripts/office/validators/redlining.py executing git for diffing content.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill extracts text from user-provided PowerPoint files, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.\n
  • Ingestion points: Uses markitdown to extract text content from PowerPoint files (.pptx, .potx) as described in SKILL.md.\n
  • Boundary markers: Slide number markers (<!-- Slide number: N -->) are used to delimit content, but the skill lacks explicit instructions for the agent to ignore or isolate potentially malicious instructions embedded within that text.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant execution capabilities, including runtime code compilation (gcc), binary execution (subprocess.run), and file system manipulation (rezip, safe_extract).\n
  • Sanitization: The skill correctly utilizes defusedxml across its validation and cleaning scripts (scripts/clean.py, scripts/office/validate.py) to mitigate XML-based attacks like XXE.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 15, 2026, 07:56 PM