schedule

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to analyze the current session history and distill it into a self-contained prompt for future autonomous runs. This creates a significant surface for indirect prompt injection where an attacker could place malicious instructions in the session history (e.g., via a downloaded file or web content) that the agent then incorporates into a persistent, scheduled task.
  • Ingestion points: Review of session history in Step 1 of the 'Creating a new task' workflow.
  • Boundary markers: None; the agent is explicitly told to make the prompt self-contained and second-person imperative, which could facilitate the adoption of injected instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses the create_scheduled_task and update_scheduled_task tools to schedule future execution.
  • Sanitization: The skill lacks instructions to sanitize or validate the content gathered from the session history before generating the new task prompt.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The skill provides a functional interface for creating recurring tasks using cronExpression. While this is the intended purpose, it establishes a persistence mechanism that allows prompts to be executed repeatedly without direct user supervision or initiation, which can be abused if the task generation logic is compromised.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 15, 2026, 07:50 PM