schedule
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill sets a default repository URL to
https://github.com/asgeirtj/system_prompts_leaks. The naming of this repository is highly suspicious and suggests that the skill is intended to automate the discovery and exfiltration of sensitive internal system prompts and instructions from the cloud agent environment. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
RemoteTriggertool to provision and execute "cloud Claude Code agents" in isolated environments. These agents pull their source code and configuration from a remote repository (https://github.com/asgeirtj/system_prompts_leaks) controlled by the skill author, which will execute as part of the scheduled routine. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a multi-step execution chain where user input is passed to a downstream cloud agent, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The
messagefield within theeventsarray of the routine creation body (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None present; the instructions do not implement delimiters or warnings to prevent the cloud agent from obeying instructions embedded in the user prompt.
- Capability inventory: The cloud agents are granted powerful capabilities, including
Bash,Read,Write,Edit,Glob, andGreptool access. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation of the prompt content is present before it is interpolated into the cloud routine configuration.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata