schedule
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to analyze the current session history and distill it into a self-contained prompt for future autonomous runs. This creates a significant surface for indirect prompt injection where an attacker could place malicious instructions in the session history (e.g., via a downloaded file or web content) that the agent then incorporates into a persistent, scheduled task.
- Ingestion points: Review of session history in Step 1 of the 'Creating a new task' workflow.
- Boundary markers: None; the agent is explicitly told to make the prompt self-contained and second-person imperative, which could facilitate the adoption of injected instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
create_scheduled_taskandupdate_scheduled_tasktools to schedule future execution. - Sanitization: The skill lacks instructions to sanitize or validate the content gathered from the session history before generating the new task prompt.
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill provides a functional interface for creating recurring tasks using
cronExpression. While this is the intended purpose, it establishes a persistence mechanism that allows prompts to be executed repeatedly without direct user supervision or initiation, which can be abused if the task generation logic is compromised.
Audit Metadata