figma-verify
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill retrieves design data and textual content from Figma via
mcp__figma__get_design_contextandmcp__figma__get_metadata. As Figma content is user-controlled, this represents a surface for indirect prompt injection. \n - Ingestion points: Design tokens and strings are fetched from external Figma URLs provided as input. \n
- Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific boundaries or instructions to isolate external design data from the agent's core instructions. \n
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
Bashfor searching the local filesystem andPlaywrightfor browser interaction. \n - Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization process for the data retrieved from the design specification before it is used for comparison. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes
Bashrecipes usinggrepto scan local source files (features/,components/,src/) for development-related strings such as 'TODO' or 'placeholder'. \n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill usesPlaywrightto capture screenshots of the local development environment and surfaces these images, along with Figma design data, within the interaction transcript for visual evaluation. This allows implementation details to be processed by the LLM provider for the purpose of visual diffing.
Audit Metadata