open-design-blog-factory
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses specific formatting and directives to override the agent's default behavior, including tags like
<author_preferences priority="highest">and explicit instructions to "follow these first" in the event of contradictions. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The instructions expose an absolute local file path (
/Users/ashleyli/.codex/skills/blog-indexing-automation/SKILL.md), which reveals the internal directory structure and the system usernameashleylito the agent context. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to fetch and process data from external sources, presenting a risk of indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill retrieves content from external GitHub issues and pull requests through the
gh issue listandgh pr viewcommands (e.g., in theTopic discovery & scoringsection). - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or instructions to treat the data retrieved from GitHub as untrusted, increasing the risk of the agent obeying malicious instructions embedded in issue comments.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment allows for the execution of several shell-based tools, including
pnpm,gh,tsx, andpngquant. - Sanitization: No input validation or sanitization is performed on the data fetched from the external repository before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently instructs the agent to execute local command-line utilities, such as
pnpmfor build tasks,ghfor repository interaction, andpngquantfor image optimization.
Audit Metadata