muapi-floor-plan-rendering

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user input via the floor_plan_description parameter and interpolates it directly into prompts for image generation tools and API payloads.
  • Ingestion points: The floor_plan_description input defined in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack delimiters or boundary markers to isolate user input from the rest of the prompt, increasing the risk that embedded instructions could be obeyed by the underlying model.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute CLI commands (muapi) and make network requests (curl).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the user-provided text before interpolation.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's fallback instructions direct the agent to construct curl commands by substituting {{input_name}} placeholders with user-provided text. This practice creates a command injection risk if the executing agent does not properly escape shell metacharacters present in the user input.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates the transmission of user-provided descriptions and the MUAPI_API_KEY credential to an external endpoint (api.muapi.ai). While this is necessary for the skill's functionality, the destination domain is not part of a standard trusted whitelist.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 1, 2026, 11:15 PM