muapi-floor-plan-rendering
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user input via the
floor_plan_descriptionparameter and interpolates it directly into prompts for image generation tools and API payloads. - Ingestion points: The
floor_plan_descriptioninput defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack delimiters or boundary markers to isolate user input from the rest of the prompt, increasing the risk that embedded instructions could be obeyed by the underlying model.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute CLI commands (
muapi) and make network requests (curl). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the user-provided text before interpolation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's fallback instructions direct the agent to construct
curlcommands by substituting{{input_name}}placeholders with user-provided text. This practice creates a command injection risk if the executing agent does not properly escape shell metacharacters present in the user input. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates the transmission of user-provided descriptions and the
MUAPI_API_KEYcredential to an external endpoint (api.muapi.ai). While this is necessary for the skill's functionality, the destination domain is not part of a standard trusted whitelist.
Audit Metadata