smith
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external sources and relays information between different agent sessions, creating a vector for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: GitHub issue descriptions fetched via
gh(SKILL.md section 1) and worker agent outputs/transcripts read viaherdr(SKILL.md section 4, scripts/watch.sh). - Boundary markers: The prompt templates in
references/prompts.mddo not utilize explicit delimiters (like XML tags or triple quotes) or specific 'ignore' instructions to isolate ingested data from the agent's primary instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including executing git commands, creating/deleting worktrees, spawning new terminal panes, and managing GitHub pull requests (scripts/spawn.sh, scripts/mark.sh).
- Sanitization: While internal state updates in
run.jsonare handled safely viajqarguments (scripts/lib.sh), natural language communications relayed to worker agents are not sanitized for potential malicious instructions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on local shell command execution to perform orchestration and environment management.
- Evidence: Extensive use of
git,jq, and theherdrCLI to manage worktrees, background processes, and agent sessions (scripts/spawn.sh, scripts/send.sh, scripts/watch.sh).
Audit Metadata