minimizing-ty-ecosystem-changes
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted project revisions and metadata to reproduce behavior changes, establishing an indirect prompt injection attack surface.
- Ingestion points: Fetches external project revisions via
git fetchand metadata via thecollect_ty_ecosystem_run_metadata.pyscript. - Boundary markers: None identified; there are no explicit instructions to the agent to ignore or delimit embedded instructions in the analyzed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities including filesystem writes (
mkdir,cp), software compilation (cargo build), package installation (uv run), and execution of dynamic shell commands. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation for the project-specific commands or the content being minimized.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow requires executing shell commands to build the 'ty' binary using
cargo buildand subsequently running the generated binaries. It also executes dynamic commands output by thesetup_primer_project.pyhelper script. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads the
mypy-primerutility from a third-party GitHub repository (https://github.com/hauntsaninja/mypy_primer) usinguv run. It also implicitly downloads Rust crates during thecargo buildprocess.
Audit Metadata