astrale-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documentation describes commands that allow an agent to ingest untrusted data from external Astrale Kernels, which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through
astrale logs(reading kernel journals),astrale get/astrale query(reading graph nodes), andastrale introspect(reading domain schemas). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety guidelines to prevent the agent from executing instructions embedded within the data returned by these commands.
- Capability inventory: The CLI tool possesses significant capabilities, including performing network mutations (
astrale mutate), making remote procedure calls (astrale call), generating local source code (astrale ui init), and issuing authentication tokens (astrale token). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of external content before it is processed or presented to the agent.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill explicitly documents the sensitive directory structure where the CLI stores credentials and session data, facilitating potential exfiltration if the agent is compromised.
- Evidence: The "Storage" section lists sensitive paths under
~/.astrale, includingkeys/(private keys),idp-sessions/(upstream identity provider tokens), andconfig.json. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The CLI is designed to download and install executable code or configuration from remote sources at runtime.
- Evidence: The
astrale ui addcommand fetches patterns and themes from a remote registry based on a commit snapshot. Theastrale domain installcommand allows installing domain logic directly from an external URL.
Audit Metadata