prepare-providers-documentation

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 31, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill demonstrates an Indirect Prompt Injection surface by fetching and processing external, untrusted content to perform sensitive versioning tasks.
  • Ingestion points: PR titles, bodies, and code diffs are retrieved via gh pr view and gh pr diff in Phase 3 to be analyzed by a sub-agent.
  • Boundary markers: The prompt instructions for the classification sub-agent do not include explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore commands potentially embedded within the PR data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to modify provider.yaml (which determines package versions) and changelog.rst, and it executes the breeze CLI tool for project orchestration.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the PR content before it is processed by the LLM.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of local shell commands and specialized tools to automate the release workflow.
  • It invokes git, gh, and the Airflow breeze CLI.
  • In Phase 5, the skill specifies the command prek run, which appears to be a typo for the standard pre-commit run tool used in the project. Executing misspelled or unknown binaries can be a security concern, although it is likely a non-malicious error in this specific context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 31, 2026, 08:43 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — prepare-providers-documentation