prepare-providers-documentation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill demonstrates an Indirect Prompt Injection surface by fetching and processing external, untrusted content to perform sensitive versioning tasks.
- Ingestion points: PR titles, bodies, and code diffs are retrieved via
gh pr viewandgh pr diffin Phase 3 to be analyzed by a sub-agent. - Boundary markers: The prompt instructions for the classification sub-agent do not include explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore commands potentially embedded within the PR data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to modify
provider.yaml(which determines package versions) andchangelog.rst, and it executes thebreezeCLI tool for project orchestration. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the PR content before it is processed by the LLM.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of local shell commands and specialized tools to automate the release workflow.
- It invokes
git,gh, and the AirflowbreezeCLI. - In Phase 5, the skill specifies the command
prek run, which appears to be a typo for the standardpre-commit runtool used in the project. Executing misspelled or unknown binaries can be a security concern, although it is likely a non-malicious error in this specific context.
Audit Metadata