bunshin
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill employs a custom modular loading system (
load_skill,load_ref) to dynamically retrieve and display markdown-based instructions and reference files. These modules are sourced from computed local paths identified through extensive environmental probing of common skill installation directories (e.g.,~/.claude/skills,~/.agents/skills,/sessions,/mnt/skills/plugins). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The pipeline includes a 'HARVEST' phase that ingests content from external sources, including client social profiles, existing websites, and provided documents. This untrusted data is synthesized by agents into a
PRODUCT.mdfile used to direct subsequent site-building activities, creating an entry point for indirect prompt injection attacks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation and error handling logic reference external resources for installation and updates, specifically suggesting the use of
npxto fetch code from vendor-controlled domains and repositories (genjutsu.athevon.dev,github.com/athevon/genjutsu). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill orchestrates a wide range of shell operations across parallel clones, including the execution of
rsync,find,node,headless Chrome, and framework-specific binaries. It also executes a Python-based design audit script (audit.py) retrieved from the dynamically resolved skill base directory.
Audit Metadata