codex-delegation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands to interact with the Codex CLI, including
codex exec,codex login, andcodex --version. It also references executing local scripts viauv runandmake. These commands are consistent with the skill's stated purpose of delegating tasks to an external CLI tool. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to install the
@openai/codexpackage globally using npm. This package is an official tool from OpenAI, a well-known and trusted service provider, and its inclusion for the purpose of the skill is appropriate. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied prompts as positional arguments for the
codex execcommand. This represents a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if the inputs are not properly sanitized or if the agent executes instructions embedded within the data provided to the Codex model. - Ingestion points: Prompts are passed as positional arguments to
codex execor as aPROMPTvariable in a Makefile. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or delimiters for untrusted data are shown in the usage examples.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via the CLI, write output to files in the
delegations/codex/directory, and read file context from the local filesystem. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the prompt input within the provided documentation.
Audit Metadata