do-issue
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it retrieves and processes untrusted content from external issue trackers to generate task plans for autonomous subagents.\n
- Ingestion points: In
modules/issue-discovery.md, the skill usesghandglabCLIs to fetch titles, bodies, and comments from issues.\n - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to help the agent isolate external issue content from its core instructions.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill dispatches subagents with the authority to modify source code, execute shell commands, and interact with the git platform.\n
- Sanitization: Extracted requirements are used to form task plans in
modules/task-planning.mdwithout visible sanitization or filtering of the retrieved content.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local shell commands for git operations, platform interaction, and process isolation.\n - Evidence: The skill frequently uses
git,gh,glab, andtmuxthroughout its modules for branch management, issue updates, and parallel execution coordination.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates sending feedback to a vendor-controlled public repository.\n - Evidence:
modules/completion.mdcontains instructions to post "Tooling Reflection" feedback to the author's public GitHub discussion page athttps://github.com/athola/claude-night-market/discussions. While it warns against including repository-specific code, it creates an automated pathway for observations to leave the local environment.
Audit Metadata