glm-delegation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data (such as project documentation or source code) and feeds it to an LLM via the
claudeCLI, which creates an attack surface for indirect instructions.\n- Ingestion points: File content passed via the--filesflag or direct prompt interpolation in theclaudecommand.\n- Boundary markers: Absent. The skill documentation does not define explicit instruction delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings to separate user instructions from processed file content.\n- Capability inventory: Executes shell commands viaclaude, a local script (delegation_executor.py), andmakeautomation.\n- Sanitization: Absent. No sanitization or validation of input file content is mentioned before it is processed by the model.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to install the official@anthropic-ai/claude-codepackage from the NPM registry. This targets a well-known package from a trusted organization (Anthropic) and is documented neutrally as a prerequisite.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several command-line tools, includingclaude,python, andmake, to facilitate its core delegation functionality. These commands are configured via environment variables and do not involve arbitrary shell execution or unsafe user-supplied arguments outside of their intended operational context.
Audit Metadata