project-planning
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The "Post-Completion: Workflow Continuation" section contains instructions to bypass user interaction. Specifically, it states "Do NOT prompt the user for confirmation: this is a lightweight checkpoint, not an interactive gate." This instruction attempts to override the agent's default safety behavior of confirming actions with the user.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes project specifications to generate planning documents and writes to the file system, which creates a vulnerability to instructions hidden in the processed data.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests user-provided specifications at runtime to convert them into implementation plans.
- Boundary markers: None. The skill does not define delimiters or specific instructions to disregard embedded commands within the input text.
- Capability inventory: The skill is capable of writing to the local file system (e.g.,
docs/implementation-plan.md,docs/tradeoffs.md) and invoking additional skills such asSkill(attune:project-execution). - Sanitization: None. There are no defined mechanisms for filtering, validating, or escaping content found within the input specification documents.
Audit Metadata