session-handoff
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's core workflow involves extracting structured data from session transcripts and re-injecting it into the prompt context during future sessions via the
+recallmechanism. - Ingestion points: The skill sweeps the current session transcript (untrusted data) during the 'Two-Phase Extraction' process defined in
modules/two-phase-extraction.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions to wrap the extracted content in delimiters (e.g., XML tags) or to include warnings for the agent to ignore instructions embedded within retrieved units.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes file system writes to stage data in
data/state/handoff_units.json, which is then processed by a platform-level recall hook (plugins/memory-palace/hooks/recall.py) to inject content into subsequent turns. - Sanitization: The instructions lack requirements for sanitizing or escaping the content of the
State,Why, orOpenfields before they are stored and later re-injected. This allows potentially malicious instructions or adversarial content present in a session transcript to be persisted across session boundaries.
Audit Metadata