skill-library-mission
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill operates by discovering 'tribal knowledge' from the entire repository, including unvetted sources like git history, TODO/FIXME comments, and discussion logs. This data is used to populate prompts for authoring new skills, creating a surface for embedded malicious instructions to influence the agent.
- Ingestion points: Local file system (README, manifests, build configs, CI files, git history, TODO/FIXME hotspots, discussions, ADRs, and journals) as described in
SKILL.mdunder Phase 1: Discover. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or warnings are used to isolate ingested data from instructions in the generated prompts for the authoring agents.
- Capability inventory: Extensive file system read access; local file system write (restricted by a 'write fence' to
.claude/skills/and.attune/mission-state.json); local command execution for verification and build system analysis. - Sanitization: The instructions do not define any sanitization, escaping, or filtering of repository content before it is interpolated into prompts.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves generating new
SKILL.mdfiles that contain 'provenance and maintenance' commands, which are subsequently executed during the review phase to verify claims. - Evidence:
modules/review-protocol.mdrequires the FACTUAL lens reviewer to "run each skill's provenance one-liners." - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to execute shell commands to investigate the repository's build system and run maintenance checks.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdincludes maintenance commands likerg -c "Phase" ...andls .claude/skills/ | head -5, and instructions to verify how tests actually run during Phase 1.
Audit Metadata