stack-mode
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from PR descriptions and comments to resolve stack membership.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads PR branch names, body content, and comments via
gh pr viewto determine relationships between PRs. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to the agent to ignore potentially malicious directions embedded in the PR metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
ghandgitto query PR states and post comments. While it does not perform destructive actions (push/delete), it can iterate user-provided workflows across multiple PRs. - Sanitization: The skill uses specific regex patterns and
grep -oEto extract only PR numbers and branch prefixes, which significantly limits the risk of arbitrary instruction execution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides shell-based logic for the agent to execute, relying on local CLI tools to perform automation.
- Evidence: Multiple code blocks in
SKILL.mdprovide bash script templates for resolving stack membership and iterating through PR lists usinggh(GitHub CLI) andgitcommands. - Context: The commands are standard for git workflow automation, and variables are generally quoted to prevent simple shell injection.
Audit Metadata