opencode
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the installation of the
opencode-aipackage vianpmor a custom Homebrew tap (anomalyco/tap/opencode). This involves downloading and executing code from external sources that are not part of the platform's trusted vendor list. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of
terminalandprocesscommands to interact with the system and the external coding agent, which is granted significant autonomy over the project workspace. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill enables workflows where it clones remote repositories and attaches arbitrary files for analysis by an autonomous agent, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Usage of
git cloneto pull remote code and the-fflag inSKILL.mdto attach files for processing. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific delimiters or warnings to the agent to treat external code as untrusted data rather than instructions.
- Capability inventory: The
opencodeagent can read and modify files, run commands, and perform long-running tasks via theterminaltool. - Sanitization: There are no procedures defined for validating or filtering the contents of remote repositories before the agent processes them.
Audit Metadata