twg-confluence
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from external sources, specifically Confluence pages, blog posts, and space-level configuration files.
- Ingestion points: Content is retrieved via
confluence content get(inreferences/content.md) and space instructions are loaded fromAGENTS.MDfiles usingconfluence space instructions get(inreferences/spaces.md). - Boundary markers: The skill establishes clear boundaries by requiring the agent to distinguish between automated CLI flags (
--yes) and explicit user intent. It also instructs the agent to ignore surface-specific guidance (like MCP-only tools) that may appear in data bundles. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
twgCLI, which possesses capabilities to create, modify, move, and delete content, as well as manage space permissions and hierarchy. - Sanitization: Security is addressed through behavioral constraints, such as mandatory read-before-write workflows, the use of optimistic concurrency tokens to prevent data overwrites, and strict requirements for user confirmation before destructive actions like archiving or purging.
Audit Metadata