build-avatar-app

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation in references/server.md provides a command to install the atmee-toolkit CLI by downloading and executing a shell script from the author's official GitHub repository (https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Atmanity/atmee-toolkit/main/install.sh). This is an intended setup procedure for the vendor's developer tools.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The templates/try.html file references the livekit-client library via the well-known JSDelivr CDN (https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/livekit-client@2.22.3/+esm). This is a standard practice for including reputable third-party client-side dependencies.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill involves building an interface that processes real-time user input from a LiveKit room, which represents a potential attack surface for instructions embedded in user speech or text.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted user data enters the system through the LiveKit room's transcription (lk.transcription) and chat (lk.chat) topics, as handled in templates/avatar-room.js.
  • Boundary markers: The architecture uses structured state and event messages to communicate context to the avatar. While the templates demonstrate sending data, they do not explicitly define developer-level delimiters or safety instructions to separate system context from raw user-provided strings.
  • Capability inventory: The AI avatar has the capability to trigger "app tools" (client-side functions) such as updating the user interface (show_slide) or fetching dynamic data (get_score).
  • Sanitization: The provided example code does not include explicit sanitization or filtering of transcription data before it is processed by the AI agent's runtime environment.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 19, 2026, 10:58 PM